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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Frank Joseph Evans and nine other defendants were 
charged in a 25-count indictment with conspiracy and drug 
trafficking offenses.  On April 21, 1993, Evans pled guilty to 
conspiracy to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine (21 
U.S.C. § 846 (1988)) and criminal forfeiture (21 U.S.C. § 853 
(a)(1)-(2) (1988)).  On July 8, 1993, the defendant filed a pro 
se motion to withdraw his guilty plea which was denied on October 
15, 1993.  On May 9, 1994, the defendant was sentenced to 360 
months imprisonment followed by five years supervised release.  
He was also ordered to pay a special assessment of $50 and a fine 
of $1,000.  We will vacate the defendant's sentence and remand to 
the district court for resentencing. 
 I. 
 The defendant was arrested in Houston, Texas on July 
20, 1992, while operating a motor vehicle containing 36 kilograms 
of cocaine in a concealed compartment.  He identified himself to 
law enforcement officers as Frank Evans and produced a 
Pennsylvania driver's license which confirmed this information.  
On at least three subsequent court appearances, including his 
change of plea hearing, the defendant identified himself as Frank 
Evans. 
  
 The defendant's true identity was first learned when he 
disclosed it to a probation officer after he pled guilty but 
before his sentencing.  The government, through fingerprint 
comparison, confirmed the defendant was in fact Ronald Dawkins.  
Dawkins had a prior criminal record and was wanted as a parole 
absconder and fugitive in South Carolina. 
 At sentencing, the district court rejected the 
government's contention that the defendant obstructed justice by 
giving law enforcement officials a false name and denied the 
defendant's request for a downward departure based upon his 
disclosure of his true identity.  The court then sentenced the 
defendant to 360 months imprisonment.1 
 II. 
 The district court may depart from the applicable range 
calculated under the United States Sentencing Guidelines where 
"the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating 
                     
1
.  The presentence report determined the defendant's base 
offense level to be 40 because of his participation in the 
delivery of between 500 and 700 kilograms of cocaine.  This was 
supported by testimony presented by the government at the 
sentencing hearing.  The base level was increased by two for the 
defendant's role as a manager in the organization under U.S.S.G. 
§ 3B1.1(c) and decreased by two for his acceptance of 
responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).  The defendant's 
criminal history was determined to be in category III, based on 
five criminal history points.  Two of these points were assigned 
because the offense was committed during a period of a previous 
criminal justice sentence, including parole, and the other three 
points resulted from the prior conviction itself.  Thus, the five 
points were added as a direct result of the defendant's 
disclosure of his true identity.  Absent this disclosure, the 
defendant would have had no criminal history points (criminal 
history category I), and the minimum sentence under the 
guidelines would have been 292 months instead of 360 months. 
  
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that 
described."  18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988).  According to the policy 
statement in U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, circumstances that may warrant 
departure are generally of two kinds: factors the Commission did 
not adequately consider in formulating the guidelines and factors 
that were considered but resulted in an inadequate guideline 
level because of unusual circumstances substantially in excess of 
the ordinary. 
 A discretionary decision by the trial judge that a 
departure is not justified is not reviewable.  See United States 
v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82, 84 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. 
Higgins, 967 F.2d 841, 844 (3d Cir. 1992).  But there is 
appellate jurisdiction where a court refuses to depart from the 
guidelines because it believes it lacks the authority to do so.  
Gaskill, 991 F.2d at 84; Higgins, 967 F.2d at 844. 
 In this case, the defendant maintains that except for 
his voluntary disclosure, his true identity would not have been 
ascertained.  The probation officer who prepared the presentence 
investigation acknowledged he would not have discovered the 
defendant's true identity without the disclosure:  "[A]s far as I 
knew he had no criminal history and I would not have looked any 
further from that point. . . .  [I] would never have found out 
who he was." 
 The defendant contends that his voluntary admission to 
the probation officer of his true identity and his prior record 
  
are circumstances of a kind or to a degree not contemplated by 
the sentencing guidelines.  He maintains that his sentence should 
be vacated and the matter remanded for resentencing because the 
district court erroneously believed it did not have authority to 
depart downward from the sentencing guideline range. 
 The government claims the sentencing court believed it 
possessed the authority under § 5K2.0 to depart if it found that 
circumstances warranted, but decided there was no basis for such 
a departure.  Evidence of this belief, the government contends, 
is found in the court's order of May 3, 1994, stating in part, 
"it is hereby ORDERED that parties are notified that this Court 
is considering a reduction in the criminal history category -- 
from category III to category I -- under which Mr. Evans will be 
sentenced pursuant to § 5K2.0 due to the unique circumstances 
that surrounded Mr. Evans' presentence report interview." 
 It is true that a substantial portion of the sentencing 
hearing was devoted to a discussion of the possibility of 
downward departure because the defendant had volunteered 
information that resulted in an increase in his criminal history 
category.  During this discussion the court stated: 
 But secondly . . . am I not entitled in 
measuring in some way the credit that's to be 
given for acceptance of responsibility or for 
something else, entitled to take into 
consideration that this man volunteered all 
this knowledge with these consequences, not 
that he had a right to withhold it, but that 
despite the consequences he volunteered it?  
And I just wonder whether that is a situation 
which is -- was contemplated by the drafters 
of the guidelines. 
 
  
But at the conclusion of the hearing the judge stated: 
 I hold that I do not have the power to apply 
a lesser guideline or to make a downward 
departure.  I must say that I feel that . . . 
a 30-year sentence is more severe than I 
would impose were I free to find a lesser 
guideline or free to depart downward.  But I 
hold that I do not have the power. 
 
 Although the government makes a plausible argument that 
the court determined there was no justification for a departure, 
the matter is sufficiently ambiguous ("I hold that I do not have 
the power . . . .") to require vacating the sentence and 
remanding if the defendant's actions could satisfy the 
requirements of U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0.  Cf. United States v. Mummert, 
34 F.3d 201, 205 (3d Cir. 1994) (vacating sentence and remanding 
to district court because "the record does not make clear whether 
the district court's denial of departure was based on legal or 
discretionary grounds"). 
 III. 
 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 quotes the language of 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(b), permitting the sentencing court to "impose a sentence 
outside the range established by the applicable guideline, if the 
court finds 'that there exists an aggravating or mitigating 
circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that 
described.'"   
 To determine whether a proposed departure satisfies § 
5K2.0, we must first consider whether the defendant's actions 
  
could constitute a "mitigating circumstance."  If so, then we 
must decide whether such circumstance is "of a kind, or to a 
degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a 
sentence different from that described."  U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)).    
 A. 
 Since the adoption of the sentencing guidelines, courts 
have been wrestling with just what constitutes a mitigating 
circumstance that justifies downward departure.  In United States 
v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989, 998-99 (3d Cir. 1992), we permitted 
the district court to depart downward when a prosecutor's 
manipulation of an indictment foreclosed the grouping of two 
related offenses under the guidelines, thereby resulting in a 
higher sentence than usual.  We allowed the departure because 
otherwise "it would raise the prosecutor to a position supreme 
over the district judge vis-a-vis sentencing by virtue of the 
uncontrolled charging discretion."  Id. at 998.  In United States 
v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1993), we allowed a downward 
departure because the defendant was the sole source of care for 
his mentally ill wife.  In so holding, we noted that "departures 
are an important part of the sentencing process because they 
offer the opportunity to ameliorate, at least in some aspects, 
the rigidity of the Guidelines themselves."  Id. at 86.  Thus, as 
we noted in United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1067 (3d 
Cir. 1990), "[i]f a case is atypical, or for some other reason 
falls outside the scope of cases considered by the Sentencing 
  
Commission, the Guidelines have fairly expansive language 
allowing for discretionary departure." 
 But in United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143, 1148-49 
(3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1841 (1994), we held that 
prisoners' loss of good time credits as a disciplinary sanction 
for assaulting prison guards could not be considered a mitigating 
factor in their subsequent convictions and sentences for 
assaulting, impeding, and interfering with those same guards.  We 
stated that "[t]he gravamen of a mitigating circumstance is that 
it somehow reduces the defendant's guilt or culpability.  It is a 
circumstance that 'in fairness and mercy, may be considered as 
extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability.'" Id. at 
1148 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1002 (6th ed. 1990)).  
 The government here cites the Newby definition of  
"mitigating circumstance" and contends that the defendant's 
disclosure of his identity does not impact upon his "guilt or 
culpability" for the offense.  But the government's reliance on 
Newby is misplaced.  In United States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793 (3d 
Cir. 1994), the government offered a similar argument as to why 
the defendant's anguish at seeing his son convicted for aiding 
and abetting his crime could not be used as the basis for a 
downward departure.  We rejected that contention, noting that 
"the Commission [did] not intend to limit the kinds of factors, 
whether or not mentioned elsewhere in the guidelines, that could 
constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case."  Id. at 803 
(quoting U.S.S.G. Manual 6 (1993)).  We noted in Monaco that the 
reasons for departure in Gaskill and Lieberman had nothing to do 
  
with the defendant's culpability.  We held, therefore, that "to 
the extent that Newby's pronouncement on moral culpability can be 
read to implicitly overrule decisions such as Gaskill and 
Lieberman, the Newby language must be considered dictum.  
Accordingly, nothing in Newby prevents a downward departure in 
this case."  Id. (citation and footnote omitted).2 
 We find the Monaco reasoning applicable to this case.
 Furthermore, a less restrictive view of the district 
court's discretion to depart downward is bolstered by the 
Sentencing Commission's recent amendment to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0.  
The amendment, which became effective on November 1, 1994, added 
the following language: 
 An offender characteristic or other 
circumstance that is not ordinarily relevant 
in determining whether a sentence should be 
outside the applicable guideline range may be 
relevant to this determination if such 
characteristic or circumstance is present to 
an unusual degree and distinguishes the case 
from the "heartland" cases covered by the 
guidelines in a way that is important to the 
statutory purposes of sentencing. 
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 (Policy Statement) 
 The Sentencing Commission said this amendment provided 
guidance "as to when an offender characteristic or other 
                     
2
.  Monaco did not, however, disturb Newby's holding that the 
loss of good time credits did not merit downward departure.  As 
we noted in Monaco, "we construe Newby as focusing primarily on 
the fact that because criminal sentences and disciplinary 
sanctions are designed to serve different purposes, a departure 
would defeat the goals of the criminal justice system by giving 
incarcerated defendants lesser sentences than they deserved."  23 
F.3d 793, 803 n.16 (3d Cir. 1994). 
  
circumstance (or combination of such characteristics or 
circumstances) that is not ordinarily relevant to a determination 
of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline 
range may be relevant to this determination."  Amendment 508, 
U.S.S.G. App. C.  The amendment provides that a court may use a 
broad range of factors in departing from the guidelines, allowing 
characteristics or circumstances "not ordinarily relevant" to be 
considered if "important to the statutory purposes of 
sentencing."  Therefore, we believe the defendant's disclosure of 
his true identity could constitute a "mitigating circumstance," 
within the meaning of § 5K2.0. 
 B. 
 Although we have determined that defendant's conduct 
potentially could constitute a "mitigating circumstance," we 
still must examine whether such circumstance could be "of a kind, 
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the 
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines."  U.S.S.G. § 
5K2.0.  The defendant contends that his disclosure of his true 
identity constitutes a basis for departure as acceptance of 
responsibility substantially in excess of the norm under § 5K2.0 
and our decision in United States v. Lieberman, 971 F.2d 989 (3d 
Cir. 1992).   
 In Lieberman, a bank vice president was accused by bank 
officials of embezzlement.  Once accused, Lieberman immediately 
admitted his wrongdoing, resigned his position, explained to bank 
managers how they could detect such wrongdoing in the future, and 
agreed to make restitution for more than he thought he owed.  Id. 
  
at 991, 996.  Lieberman received an initial two-level deduction 
for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a),3 as 
did the defendant here.  The district court then departed from 
the guidelines by granting Lieberman a one-level reduction based 
on his "unusual degree of acceptance of responsibility."  Id. at 
992. 
 After a thorough review of the guidelines' treatment of 
"acceptance of responsibility" and the justifications for a 
downward departure, we stated in Lieberman that "[t]here is some 
indication from the Sentencing Commission that the scheme 
established by the Guidelines encompasses a departure for the 
degree of acceptance of responsibility."  Id. at 995.  We 
affirmed the district court on this ground, noting that "courts 
'have recognized that a defendant's ameliorative post-arrest 
conduct may justify a departure even though section 3E1.1 rewards 
acceptance of responsibility'" and "that a sentencing court may 
depart downward when the circumstances of a case demonstrate a 
degree of acceptance of responsibility that is substantially in 
excess of that ordinarily present."  Id. at 996 (citations 
omitted). 
 The government claims, however, that defendant's 
conduct here does not even merit recognition as acceptance of 
responsibility and certainly not as acceptance "substantially in 
                     
3
.  U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) provides:  "If the defendant clearly 
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, 
decrease the offense level by 2 levels."  The commentary then 
lists eight nonexclusive factors a court may consider in 
determining whether to apply § 3E1.1. 
  
excess of that ordinarily present," as required by Lieberman.  
Id.  The government contends the defense position ignores the 
tenuous nature and limited scope of the defendant's acceptance of 
responsibility.4  In fact, the government maintains that the 
defendant's disclosure of his true name was nothing more than 
what was required of him and, had he failed to do so, he would 
have been subject to an enhancement for obstruction of justice 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.  Compare United States v. Mohammed, 
27 F.3d 815, 822 (2d Cir.) ("An obstruction enhancement is 
warranted when a defendant provides false information [such as 
his name] to the Probation Department."), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 451 (1994), with United States v. Alpert, 28 F.3d 1104, 1107-
08 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) ("[A] district court applying the 
enhancement because a defendant gave a false name at arrest must 
explain how that conduct significantly hindered the prosecution 
or investigation of the offense.").5 
                     
4
.  It is true that soon after pleading guilty the defendant 
moved to withdraw his guilty plea.  When that motion was denied, 
he then contested the extent of his involvement in the conspiracy 
and disputed the claim that he had held a position as a 
supervisor in the organization.  By accepting the probation 
department's recommendation, however, the government contends the 
court necessarily found that the defendant had been responsible 
for the distribution of more than 500 kilograms of cocaine and 
had maintained a managerial role in the conspiracy.  These are 
factors for the district court to consider in determining whether 
to exercise its discretion to depart downward. 
5
.  We note that an Application Note to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 states 
that "a defendant is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively 
admit, relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction in order 
to obtain a reduction" under this section. 
  
 Although we do not condone the defendant's concealment 
of his true identity, we do not believe the district court is 
foreclosed from deciding that the defendant's later disclosure of 
his correct name might warrant downward departure.  As we noted, 
the probation officer who prepared the presentence investigation 
admitted he would not have discovered the defendant's true 
identity without the disclosure.  It would appear, therefore, 
that the defendant has made a colorable argument that his 
voluntary disclosure of identity might constitute a degree of 
acceptance of responsibility substantially in excess of the norm.  
The district court indicated at the sentencing hearing that the 
defendant's disclosure despite the consequences might present 
such a situation of extraordinary acceptance of responsibility 
not contemplated by the guidelines.  We leave this determination 
to the discretion of the sentencing court. 
 IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the 
defendant's sentence and remand to the district court for 
resentencing. 
